For Nearly 20 Years, the U.S. Nuclear Launch Code Was 00000000

This is Lee Habib, and this is Our American Stories, the show where America is the star and the American people, coming to you from the city where the West begins, Fort Worth, Texas. PAL codes, or codes for Permissive Action Links, are complex multi-digit combinations that vary for each nuclear weapons system, which prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. But this wasn’t always so. Here to tell the story is Simon Whistler from the Today I Found Out YouTube channel. Let’s take a listen.

During the height of the Cold War, the US military put such an emphasis on rapid response to an attack on American soil that, to minimize any foreseeable delay in launching a nuclear missile for nearly two decades, they intentionally set the launch codes of every silo in the United States to a string of eight zeros. I guess the first thing that we need to address is how this came to be in the first place. Well, in 1962, JFK signed the National Action Security Memorandum 160, which was supposed to ensure that every nuclear weapon in the US was fitted with a Permissive Action Link (PAL), basically a small device that ensured that the missile could be launched with only the right code and with the right authority. There was particularly a concern that the nuclear missiles the United States had stationed in other countries, some of which had somewhat unstable leaderships, could potentially be seized by those governments and launched. With the PAL system, this became much less of a problem. Beyond foreign seizure, there was also the problem that many US commanders had the ability to launch nukes under their control at any time. Just one commanding officer who wasn’t quite in the head, and World War III begins. As US General Horace M. Wade stated about General Thomas Power: “I used to worry about General Power. I used to worry that General Power was not stable. I used to worry about the fact that he had control over so many weapons and weapons systems and could, under certain conditions, launch the force. Back in the days before we had real positive control, by Powerlock’s SAC had the power to do a lot of things, and it was in his hands, and he knew it.” To give you an idea of how secure the PAL system was at this time, bypassing one was described once as being about as complex as performing a tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end. This system was supposed to be essentially hot-wire proof, making sure only people with the correct codes could activate the nuclear weapons and launch the missiles. However, though the devices were supposed to be fitted on every nuclear missile after JFK issued his memorandum, the military continually dragged its heels on the matter. In fact, it was noted that a full twenty years after JFK had ordered PALs to be fitted to every nuclear device, half of the missiles in Europe were still protected by simple mechanical locks. Most that did have the new system in place weren’t even activated until 1977. Those in the US that had been fitted with the devices, such as the one in the Minuteman silos, were installed under the close scrutiny of Robert McNamara, JFK’s Secretary of Defense.

And the conventional wisdom is: don’t make the same mistake twice. Learn from your mistakes. And we all do. Maybe we make the same mistake three times, but hopefully not four or five. There will be no learning period. The nuclear weapons: you make one mistake, you’re going to destroy nations.

However, these Strategic Air Commands greatly resented McNamara’s presence, and almost as soon as he left, the code to launch the missiles, or fifty of them, was set to eight zeros. Oh, and in case you actually did forget the code, it was handily written down on a checklist handed out to soldiers, as Dr. Bruce G. Blair, who was once a Minuteman launch officer, stated: “Our launch checklist in fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel.” This ensured that there was no need to wait for presidential confirmation that would have just wasted valuable Russian-nuking time. To be fair, there was also the possibility that command centers or communication lines could be wiped out. So having a bunch of nuclear missiles sitting around, unlaunchable because nobody had the code, was seen as a greater risk by the military brass than a few soldiers simply deciding to launch the missiles without proper authorization. Dr. Blair, whose résumé to date is far too long to write out here, is the one who broke this eight-zeros news to the world in his 2004 article, “Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark.” He also outlines the significant disconnect between the nation’s elected leaders and the military when it came to nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Dr. Blair had previously made waves in 1977 when he wrote another article entitled, “The Terrorist Threat to World’s Nuclear Programs.” He had first attempted to communicate the serious security problems at the nuclear silos to Congressmen starting around 1973. When that information fell on mostly deaf ears, he decided to outline it for the public in this 1977 article, where he described how just four people acting in tandem could easily activate a nuclear launch in the silos he had worked in. Further, among other things, the panel system McNamara had touted was barely an operation, and thus launches could be authorized by anyone without presidential authority. He also noted how virtually anyone who asked for permission to tour the launch facility or was granted it with little to no background checks performed. It is perhaps no coincidence that the PAL systems were all activated and the codes changed the same year this article was published. So, to recap, for around twenty years, the Strategic Air Commands went out of their way to make launching a nuclear missile as easy and quick as possible. To be fair, they had their reasons, such as the fact that the soldiers in the silos, in the case of a real nuclear war, may have needed to be able to launch the missiles without being able to contact anyone on the outside. That said, their actions were in direct violation of the orders of the commander-in-chief. Further, not activating this safeguard and lack of security ensured that someone with very little planning, someone with three friends who had a mind to, could have started World War III. We don’t even think that could pass for a bad conspiracy theory film plot, but history is so often stranger than fiction.

And a terrific job on the production, editing, and storytelling by our own Greg Hengler, and a special thanks to frequent contributor Simon Whistler from the Today I Found Out YouTube channel and its sister, the Brain Food Show podcast. I recommend both of them heartily. The story of the remedy for the nuclear launch code here on Our American Stories. Lee Habib here, and I’d like to encourage you to subscribe to Our American Stories on Apple Podcasts, the iHeartRadio app, Spotify, or wherever you get our podcasts. Any story you missed or want to hear again can be found there daily. Please subscribe to the Our American Stories podcast on Apple Podcasts, the iHeartRadio app, or anywhere you get your podcasts. It helps us keep these great American stories coming.